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Design of an Innovative Governance Framework for Major Public Investment Projects: a comparative study of Governance Frameworks in UK and Norway  Abstract  How can a country make sure that public funding is not wasted on bad projects? What kind of governance framework for major investments is needed to ensure the right projects are started and that they are executed efficiently? This paper investigates such questions based on a comparative study of governance regimes established in UK and Norway.  A governance framework defines how resources and risks are distributed among stakeholders. Laws and regulatory mechanisms make up the structure, and information, auditing and other control measures are actively used to secure the intended results. It also makes roles and responsibilities of administration and the political system clearer. The literature describes how governance is a way of regulating society and corporations, public governance pointing towards the public sector and corporate governance pointing to the private sector. According to some researchers, the difference between private and public sectors is getting smaller.  In order to find the right set of framework elements and governance principles, you need to look at the objectives of the governance framework and the contextual parameters of the situation. This study shows that there are many different elements and governance principles available. Designing the framework to work as a whole is the challenge.  Comparing the two governance frameworks reveal that the aim of their development and implementation is very similar. Still they are very different. The paper does not conclude that one is better than the other. Different characteristics are: - Simplicity vs. Completeness  - Mandatory vs. Optional - Aim at value vs. Aim at business case Further the paper invests common governance principles available to design a good governance framework for major public investment projects and concludes with some of the most important questions and design choices at hand when designing or improving such a framework.  The study is still in progress and will go further into detail on how the framework and the projects interact and carry out case-studies. 
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 Design of an Innovative Governance Framework for Major Public Investment Projects: a comparative study of Governance Frameworks in UK and Norway   How can a country make sure that public funding is not wasted on bad projects? What kind of governance framework of major investments is needed to make sure the right projects are started and that they are executed efficiently? This paper investigates such questions based on a comparative study of governance regimes established in UK and Norway. The UK framework is the established ‘state-of-the-art’ governance framework and the Norwegian one is new and innovative –still in the making.   Introduction and method: A case-study - comparing national frameworks  A governance framework designed for one country will not automatically fit another, and presentations of cases from UK and Norway at a recent conference (Concept 2006) show some interesting and important similarities and differences.  In this paper, the frameworks in UK and Norway are analysed in a wide context, identifying important differences and innovative solutions, exploring their strengths and weaknesses, based on documents and interviews of key personnel. In the ongoing research project there is also a set of case-studies looking into several projects performed under the governance framework in each of the two countries. However, these results are not ready at the time of writing.  Policy instruments can be categorized as regulations (“stick”), economic means (“carrot”) and information (“sermon”) (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998). This paper follow these lines, but on a more detailed level. The context is described by the political, social and administrative setting at the time of establishment, the triggering incident(s) and who made the initiative, how it was anchored among stakeholders and how the development process was executed. The framework is described by characteristic features like motivation and stated purpose, background (the situation it was established in), the framework elements, explicitly stated ends and goals, the governance principles, the control measures, the framework structure, policy of implementation, organisation, roles and responsibilities.  This systematic comparison of two governance frameworks gives an interesting basis for understanding the way they work and their potential for improving performance of major public investment projects.  This may give valuable insight for developing other governance frameworks.  
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Background: Trends in the project management communities and research   Project Management (PM) is in general dominated by best practices in project execution. However, issues such as organisational culture, competence standards and certification of project managers are current hot topics in the PM community– essential for managing large, complex projects. The PM research community has seen a pronounced shift in focus from project execution towards front-end management, particularly initiated by work showing that even well-managed projects often turn out to be a failure, as seen by society, the investors and other stakeholders. In the UK, this awareness particularly grew following the Downey report (Ministry of Technology 1969). In Norway this had little attention until the late 1990s when the Ministry of Finance started questioning why projects did not succeed (Berg et al 1999).  The key question is: what are the best practises securing the choice and development of the best project concepts and solutions? This shifts the focus towards early decisions and analysis in the period before the decision is made to start planning the project, when there is a higher potential for improved value or benefit of the investments. There has been considerable attention to such problems in economic and decision-making research (the “classics” of Arrow (1951), Tversky & Kahneman (1974), Edwards & Newman (1982), Keeney (1996) and later Goodwin & Wright (2004) etc.). But still, problems of making the right decisions continue. Lately, it has reached the project management area and has given an important directional correction.  Over the last 5 years it has become clear that best practices in all phases of major projects have to be supplemented by a strong focus on governance. Understanding the governance framework under which the project is undertaken is vital to the choice of methods and tools. This is of growing interest internationally – The Association for Project Management (APM) released their guidelines for governance of project management in 2004 (APM 2004), partly a response to an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on corporate governance (OECD 2004).  Several authors have highlighted the need for better project governance (Miller and Lessard 2000, OECD-PUMA 2000, Winch 2001, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, Samset 2003, Miller and Hobbs 2005) in different sectors and countries. Miller and Hobbs point out, contrary to some authors, that the Governance framework is not an inflexible and never-changing setting. Both in public and private sectors, development of frameworks for planning investment projects and project management have started (Klakegg, 2005). Some authors have studied single countries: Harpham and Kippenberger (2005) on UK; Koielnicki (2005) on how PRINCE2TM was used to reform project governance in 
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Poland, and Magnussen and Samset (2005) on establishing major-project governance regime in Norway. Others have compared sectors across different countries: Danish Ministry of Transport (2006), Boge (2006). Interesting work is also done on governance within projects –Winch (2006) being one example. There is little literature, however, discussing the governance frameworks for major investment projects in general across countries and sectors. This paper looks into this area.  Governance of projects – the theory  According to APM, ‘Governance of project management …concerns those areas of corporate governance that are specifically related to project activities. Effective governance of project management ensures that an organisation’s project portfolio is aligned to the organisation’s objectives, is delivered efficiently and is sustainable.’ (APM 2004). This definition suggests what governance frameworks for major public investments are supposed to do, in which the organisation is the country itself, the politicians and the people are stakeholders, and the Government is the governing body.  Corporate governance systems are composed of internal governance processes; the quality of the independent auditing functions present in the national economy, and the nature and quality of the corporate law and regulatory mechanisms existing within a national economy to shape corporate activity (Monks & Minow 2004, referred in Detomasi 2006). Detomasi (2006) emphasizes that despite these common elements, corporate governance systems differ dramatically between nations with regards to purpose, structure and function. Corporate governance systems reflect social, political and economic purposes. This understanding of the nature of governance systems and frameworks and their context, is part of the motivation for this study, to help both in improving established frameworks and establishing new ones.  Governance frameworks or systems are concepts that seem to indicate stability and common regulations. Miller and Hobbs (2005) question the whole concept of a common governance framework; instead developing a set of design criteria for establishing a specific governance framework when looking at megaprojects: ‘When undertaking a very large project without an adequate governance regime, most organizations are exposed to high probability of failure and the resulting significant negative impacts. Megaprojects are qualitatively more complex and riskier, and therefore require governance regimes that are different from those of more routine and less risky endeavours.’  Several definitions of ‘megaproject’ have been presented. Miller & Lessard (2000) define megaprojects as Large Engineering Projects (LEPs); ’worth more than US$ 1 billion … LEPs are 
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unique, dedicated, and usually one-off products with intensive interactions between sponsors and contractors.’ Altshuler & Luberoff’s (2003) definition implies ‘megaprojects are physical, very expensive, and public. They cost at least $250 million in inflation-adjusted year 2002 dollars [this is an approximate rather than a hard-and-fast threshold].  Mega-projects are fundamentally an expression of public authority.’ Flyvbjerg (2007) refers to megaprojects as very large investment projects and says ‘The US Federal Highway Administration defines megaprojects as major infrastructure projects that cost more than US$ 1 billion, or projects of a significant cost that attract a high level of public attention or political interest because of substantial direct and indirect impacts on the community, environment, and budgets.’  In our work it is fundamental that project governance – as a concept – has to be relevant to projects of all sizes and characteristics. Our research comprises only projects with a cost of more than NOK 500 mill. / US$ 80 mill. This is the lower cost limit used to define which projects are subject to the obligatory external quality assurance within the Norwegian governance framework.  Few of these would meet the definition of a megaproject above. At the other end of the scale, there are strong resource limitations in small projects, suggesting they might have to be treated differently. Our focal point could be termed “major projects”.  In doing this we accept the aspect of stability and common regulations embedded in a governance framework. At the same time we support the idea that the real megaprojects are of a different class which in many cases demand individual governance frameworks - many of them cross borders between different governance frameworks (countries, states etc.), and if for no other reason, adaptations has to take place to handle this. The research presented in this paper is focusing on major projects within the normal governance framework defined for the two countries.  As argued by Samset et al (2006) the present trend in public management is to choose liberalization and privatization as tools for building effective and accountable institutions in public sector, and at the same time facilitate investment and initiatives in private sector. Increased autonomy of public and private institutions has been followed by a corresponding trend to increase control measures and regulations. We have adopted this ‘world view’ and this puts our research in a macro-analytic or institutional level.  Winch (2006) points out that there are two distinctive ways to apply the word ‘governance’ to project organisations: The first refers to accountability for a project to the sponsoring corporate entity; this is the macro-analytic perspective on governance used by APM (2004) and the perspective used in this paper. The second refers to the management of relationships between the various parties engaged 
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in temporary multi-organisations (Cherns & Bryant 1984 referred in Winch 2006); this is the micro-analytical perspective on governance used by Winch. It may cause misunderstandings and ambiguity when the perspective is not stated explicitly. In a holistic view we need both perspectives. The first is important in order to understand how governance frameworks work in their political, social and administrative setting (the socio-economic context); the latter gives a more detailed and precise tool for understanding the effect of project governance and the behaviour of institutions and individuals in projects.   In summary; there needs to be a general governance framework defining how resources and risks are distributed among stakeholders. Laws and regulatory mechanisms make up the structure, and information, auditing and other control measures are actively used to secure the intended results. The literature describes how governance is a way of regulating society and corporations. Public and corporate governance point towards the public and private sectors respectively, but elements of corporate governance are also relevant towards regulating the enterprise of public affairs and according to some, the difference is getting smaller. Major public projects are an arena where the public and corporate worlds meet. Figure 1 illustrates the levels of governance concepts and the different analytic perspectives mentioned above. 
     
Front-end Planning Project Execution 
Project Governance 
Operation 
Public & Corporate Governance 
Governance 
Efficient delivery of the project Figure 1 Different levels and perspectives of governance.  
Choosing the relevant project 
Macro-analytic perspective 
Micro-analytic perspective 
Sustainable effect 
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Establishment of governance frameworks for public investment projects in UK and Norway  One of the results from reforms in UK public administration in the 1980s was a strong focus on how public investment should be performed to give greater ‘Value for Money’. During the nineties this developed into a strong governance regime for public investment projects, creating several important frameworks and PM systems such as the Gateway ProcessTM and Prince2TM (Office of Governance Commerce, or OGC) (see Gershon 1999). These systems are well-known, easily available, well-established, have been working for several years, and have affected a large number of projects, especially in the UK. The UK framework is perhaps the ‘state-of-the-art’ governance framework for major public investment projects today, and is to a large extent copied by other countries (particularly the management system Prince2TM).  In Norway several public investment projects in the nineties showed signs of problems. Based on conclusions from Berg et al. (1999), the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance established an obligatory Quality Assurance Scheme in 2000. The goal is to ensure improved quality-at-entry in large public projects. This represents an increased focus on governance principles in Norwegian public investment projects rather than a restructuring or reform of the administration. It starts with analysing the projects and through increased focus on governance principles, also raising awareness and knowledge in the administration. Compared to the UK framework, the Norwegian one is new and still forming. It should therefore be expected to represent latest developments in project management and project governance. Over the last 6 years experience has been gathered, documenting a substantial number of projects within this framework. Compared to UK the experience still has to be considered as limited and there is no accompanying ‘comprehensive toolbox’ like Prince2TM.  The long-term purpose of the governance framework in both countries is to improve government practices in project planning and execution. The following is an analysis based on a systematic comparison between the two governance frameworks.   1. The political, social and administrative context  UK and Norway are both monarchies, Western European parliamentary democracies, with a long history and many similarities. Some differences are evident: UK has a large economy with limitations in public funds, and there has also been considerable unemployment in the relevant time-
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period. Norway has a small economy with great surplus, a very strong national economy and very low unemployment; lack of human resources limits the economic growth; lack of financial resources does not, although the Norwegian government places strong limitation on the use of oil/gas income. Norway’s economy has in the whole period had a positive trend, although economical growth in 2007 is actually bigger in UK than in Norway. The situation in both countries may motivate the framework initiative - more clearly so in UK. In UK there was naturally a motivation for putting emphasis on ‘value for money’ from the start. In Norway the focus from the beginning was directed against cost overrun – a control measure to ensure realistic budgets and a good basis for execution of major projects.  The initiatives in both countries are based on a wish to improve governance in a wide sense. The UK framework was first launched in year 2000 – as was the first generation of the Norwegian one. While the UK initiative had a long history behind it, and a number of administrative units were reorganized into the Office of Government Commerce, the Norwegian initiative had no predecessor at all and did not result in any new or reorganized entity.  The initiative in UK came shortly after the ‘New Labour’ took over in 1997 after 18 years of conservative (right-wing) domination. In Norway the initiative was taken during the regime of a minority coalition of centre political parties. They came to rule after a long period of socialist domination, a situation that calls for changes marking a step of progress. There seems to be quite similar political background in the two countries – apart from the well known difference between Nordic/Scandinavian social welfare tradition and the Anglo/American strong market orientation.  In UK there is a tradition of strong public administration. There is a large influential Civil Service. Government business is divided into Departments, such as Defence, Home Office etc. Responsibility for a project is entirely within the Department: the Minister is the person responsibility for his remit, and the two people responsible are him/her (the elected politician) and the Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS, the civil servant in charge of the department). Wider government responsibility only comes through the Minister who reports to Cabinet. There probably is an influence of the UK character, which perhaps leans towards a ‘blame culture’ and a tendency to hide facts to avoid blame. Gateway reviews are looking to tease out hidden facts.  In Norway the sectoral ministry is responsible for large investment projects. Within each sector the Minister is solely responsible towards the Parliament (Stortinget). In practical terms, large government agencies under each sectoral ministry are governing the projects. The Ministers have solidarity to Government decisions, unless they dissent during Cabinet meeting. When a minister 
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makes a mistake, it is a problem for the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has to choose between defending his Minister, or letting him/her go. The Norwegian State is responsible for the actions of their employees. The state can be sued, but not the person. Bad performance often has no consequence. The traditional impression is that UK is more market- and competition-oriented. With this follows a cultural willingness to quantify, measure and publish performance measures in a wide range of areas in society. This is not the case in Norway. There is a strong sense of social responsibility not to expose anyone to public contempt. Therefore there is reluctance towards measuring performance and certainly against publishing the results. Building and construction traditions were important in forming the NO framework. The UK framework was more based on the ‘modern’ IT-sector.  One could perhaps say market is more influential in UK and responsibility of the State is more influential in Norway.   2. The beginning – how the governance frameworks came to be  UK: In the late 1990s, Peter Gershon, then at GEC, was asked by the then Prime Minister, to look at procurement in government. Gershon wrote an influential report (Gershon, 1999). This coincided with the merger between the two main UK defence companies (BAE and GEC), and the Prime Minister asked Gershon to set up the “Office of Government Commerce” (OGC), which he did in April 2000. This pulled together other elements: staff from the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA), Property Advisers to the Civil Estate (PACE) and the Buying Agency and some procurement staff from HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office. The methods in the report covered general procurement of commodities, and project procurement. They reflected practice in GEC, which had a ‘Gateway’-type process and a procurement strategy similar to OGC’s “BuyingSolutions”. There was later a general concern that ‘We need better programme management’, giving rise to the development of the ‘Centres of Excellence’ part of the framework. The espoused aim of the framework is specifically to achieve financial targets of money saved (as a combination of the work on commodities and the work on projects). Norway: Major investment projects involve big money and tend to draw much attention. People are often able to relate to the physical results (buildings, roads etc.) and media and public are interested; it is difficult to hide when goals are not met. The triggering incident was a series of unsuccessful major investment projects during the 1980’s-90’s. Repeatedly project overspent and this turned into a political problem. Deputy Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, Peder Berg, led a government committee investigating a number of project cases and the report documented the problems 
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(Berg et al, 1999). The Ministry of Finance initiated the development of the QA-regime. It was a bottom-up process within the Ministry, with Peder Berg as a driving force. It was important to achieve anchoring at a high level within the Ministry. The decision to introduce this governance framework was made by the Prime Minister's Office. For both the first and the second generation of the QA-regime the intention was to establish a system where politics and administration is well divided, with the interplay between these two sides well understood. Our interviewee said: ‘From an administrative point of view the important thing is to make sure there is always a basis for decision addressing all relevant sides of the issues involved, and an independent assessment confirming its professional quality. The intended effect of such a system is making the State able to choose the right projects and execute them well’. The two initiatives seem to have been prompted by similar developments: uncertainty due to repeated failures of major projects and changes in market, lack of success in public investment projects, strong individual contributions to put focus on the importance of public investment projects/public procurement, and support/anchoring on a high political level to do something about the problem. Better use of public funds may be said to be the aim in both countries. Both initiatives are anchored at top political level and organised under the Ministry of Finance.  The process, however, was genuinely different. In Norway the initiating process was bottom–up, as was the implementation of the improvement and learning processes following the framework. In UK the process was top–down, as was the implementation of the management system (the toolbox attached to the governance framework in UK).   3. Developing and implementing the framework  UK: OGC Gateway Reviews derived from the 1999 Gershon Report, and the Peer Review concept originated from the Successful IT report in 2000. Additional features were introduced in 2004. A later Gershon review (Gershon, 2004) says: ‘Looking forward, the OGC is committed to achieving £ 3 billion in value for money gains in the three years to 2005-06, of which around one half will come from the Gateway Review process, which requires independent assessment of projects and programmes at key points in their life-cycles.’ John Healey, Financial Secretary to the Treasury (HM Treasury, 2007) says that ‘the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) was established as a central ‘one-stop shop’ procurement organization. It has since played a key role in delivering over £8 billion of efficiency savings from public procurement.’ And further points out that ‘OGC will be given stronger powers to set out the high standards of performance required, monitor departments’ performance 
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against them, insist improvements are made where necessary and demand departmental collaboration where that improves value for money. More intelligent government procurement also has the capacity to shape the market in offering more innovative and effective products and services. To achieve these changes the OGC will have to reform. It will become a smaller, more focused, higher calibre organisation, with the skills and powers needed to drive through the necessary changes within central government.’ These changes are taking place right now, reducing the staff by almost half, and introducing new challenges like achieving sustainable procurement. The OGC works by influence and recommendation. Its recommendations are currently not mandated. This is in the traditional UK civil service culture. The OGC do not consider individual project reports once they have reported on them – rather, they look for systemic trends. Reports on a particular project go only to the sponsor responsible (the person known in PRINCE2 TM as the ‘Senior Responsible Owner’ or SRO) and the OGC – so in that sense governance of a project is limited. Responsibility for projects is divided between OGC, the Department, and other bodies such as the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (for critical projects) and National Audit Office (for audit purposes). This may give differences in governance across sectors, but hopefully equally good governance across sectors. There are a substantial number of people involved in implementing the framework, many of them giving advice to users of the tools and methods attached to the framework itself. The framework has until now been operated by influence but it might soon become mandated. Norway: It is stated by the Government (Prime Ministers Office) that better projects and better execution of investment projects is a political goal. When the QA2 was introduced in 2000 (first generation of the framework), it introduced the mandatory external assessment of projects before decision by Parliament to finance the project. The Norwegian framework is mandatory for all major projects with an expected cost of more than NOK 500 million / £42 million financed by the state (excluding Oil & Gas).  External assessments are performed by consultant companies under a framework contract with the Ministry of Finance. Development of QA2 took 1 year. The effect was as planned. Experience through 2000 – 2004 exposed a need to do something on an earlier stage. Some of the projects Parliament was invited to decide on were not mature enough. In 2005 the QA1 was introduced (second generation of the framework) and the current framework contracts are valid through 2008 with an option of two more years. The development of QA1 took a little less than 2 years. QA1 was by far the most difficult arrangement to define and develop. Responsible for the framework is the same entity for all sectors (with few exceptions). This is expected to give the same governance across sectors. The Norwegian framework is implemented by only two people. When it is necessary, the 
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Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance supports with their competence and capacity, especially in single projects. It was implemented without changes in the organisation. Anchoring is the key to this operation. The top-management and leaders of the Ministry of Finance appreciate the benefit of this arrangement, and gives support from lower organisational levels. There are many similarities, but also differences between UK and NO here: - In UK the goals of the implemented framework is more explicit, administratively focused and measured in terms of money. In Norway there are more clearly politically anchored goals, but not specifying the expected effect of implementation.  - The Norwegian framework is mandatory, forced upon the agencies/projects (control aspect: top-down), while the UK framework works by influence or recommendation.  - The Norwegian framework seems to be a bottom-up process of learning from cases – transferring experience to other sectors by coordination and building ‘the new profession’. The UK framework to some extent is a top-down introduction of a common ‘quality system’. The Centres of Excellence represent the ‘new profession’ aspect in the UK by developing better programme management.  - Both Norway and UK have established a support organization looking for systemic trends. UK as a permanent entity within the public administration, Norway as an external research program.  - UK looks only at systemic trends – Norway also on single cases. - Norway has established a centralized co-ordination arena in the PM Forum (ministries, agencies, QA-consultants and researchers meeting to discuss principles and practices), while UK has established distributed ‘centres of excellence’.  - The Norwegian development process seems to be more characterized by starting with easy parts and moving on to more important issues. The UK initiative seems to have been straight to the full scope.  The two countries seem to have chosen different strategies: Norway breaking with tradition and introducing a mandatory new arrangement, UK building on tradition and improving on what is already present through influence.  4. How it really works  In UK the chief elements of the framework are the Gateway Reviews, then later came the idea of categorisation and Mission Critical Projects, then Centres of Excellence, and now also the Project Initiation Process. The private sector engagement comes from the use of private sector experienced consultants who have been individually accredited by OGC to do Gateways. 
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The 6 Gateways are well defined, they are standardized and comprehensive documentation is available. Gateways 1 to 5 are at project level: Gateway Review 0: Strategic management (several times where appropriate) Gateway Review 1: Business Justification Gateway Review 2: Procurement Strategy Gateway Review 3: Investment Decision Gateway Review 4: Readiness for service Gateway Review 5: Benefits Realization  Gateways look at the Ministerial level all the way down to suppliers. The Parliament / Government level is done by mechanisms outside this study (Committees, NAO etc). It is possible that Gateways “rarely come up with any surprises”, tending to highlight things the team already know. Independent reviewers also look at suppliers, as they have relevant experience.  The assessment of criticality looks at - high political significance - if the programme is very risky / uncertain - high cost (this is actually a lower level criteria). The top level is the ‘Top 20’ Mission Critical projects; OGC will also sit on the project board. Then the next level is ‘High Criticality’; for these, Gateway reviews have to use senior people or even all independents. Then there are ‘medium criticality’ projects, for which Departments can call on OGC for help if there is resource available; then low criticality projects are reviewed within departments. This procedure was necessary because there are so many projects (about 100 High Critical as well as the top 20). Criticality assessment is done by a Department then between the OGC and Permanent Secretaries; also, the Mission Critical list is decided between the Head of OGC and the Prime Minister. Reviews of high-risk projects will be led by outsiders, but small or low-risk projects could be mainly internal - and for two Departments (accredited by OGC) could be entirely internal. It is possible that the level of external input (which thus isn't laid down) is reducing because of cost considerations. A third element is the development of Centres of Excellence, bringing ‘best practice’ to the Department. These centres reports directly to the Permanent Secretary of the Department. They also act as a liaison point within a Department for OGC. It is recommended that they are small, say around 4 people. For Mission Critical / High Critical projects, the Centre of Excellence will be the Department 
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representative, and will be doing mini-Gateway Reviews as the project goes on. For medium Criticality projects, the Centre of Excellence runs the Gateway reviews. OGC measure the effect of its efforts and publish results frequently, stated in terms of money saved (according to procedures laid down by the National Audit Office).  In Norway the whole framework is a control measure. The control rules are documented in the framework contracts and the control object is the documents assessed in the QA regime. The framework contracts are between the Ministry of Finance and pre-accepted QA consulting companies which executes and documents the actual control tasks. External control and assessment (independent second opinion) of the documents mentioned below is one of the main ideas behind the initiative. According to our interviewee, the QA-regime is made up of more or less well known, standard components, good practices in the areas of social economy, planning and project management. But the sum seems to be quite unique currently. The framework is simple, consisting of two gateways: QA1: The early choice of concept, the decision to initiate project pre-planning. QA2: The GO decision, the decision to finance the project.   Traditionally, vertical integration in the value-chain stops at the agency-level. The owners decided what should be delivered and at what cost. This gave incentive to spend the whole budget, including any contingency. By introducing QA1, focus is put on the rationale, the objective, of the project. It forms a logic sequence starting with the need and ending with the effect of the project. It is a tool to secure good foundation for important decisions at a point in time when there still are alternatives. QA1 and QA2 give a tool for control from the top (Parliament – Government – Ministry – Agency). Every level knows that the other levels know. This works as expectation management – and expectation influence performance. As the interviewee stated: ‘This works for us, and without using many other incentives. It is better than imposing a lot of new rules.’ The State is also a part in a commercial system, with its own position to tend to. The Norwegian QA-regime (the framework) does not address the private sector (suppliers, contractors), but it is a general idea that what we learn from this in the public sector will be transferred to the private sector.  QA1 includes the control of four documents, each subject to quality assurance:  1. A needs analysis  2. An overall objectives and strategy document  3. An overall requirements specification  4. An analysis of alternatives.  
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The project has to pass at all these stages to continue (to be presented to Government for formal decision).  No short-cuts are allowed. The important logic in QA1 is to base the project on real needs, and to choose a strategy and a concept accordingly on a very early stage. QA1 includes assessment with a very wide perspective – all relevant alternatives. QA2 includes the control of one document – with several sub-documents:  5. The Project Management Plan (including cost-estimates, progress plans, risk analysis, contract strategy, organisation) The focus in QA2 was from the beginning very much on cost, because of the historical background (cost over-run). The format is developed and standardized to include elements like contracts, pitfalls and success factors, uncertainty analysis, flexibility, scope and organisation. QA2 includes assessments with a quite narrow perspective – only the chosen alternative. The project has to pass this stage to continue (to be presented to Parliament for formal decision and financing).  No short-cuts are allowed. The QA-reports should be structured in a way that makes them useful for other parties (i.e. the relevant Ministry and Agency) as a control reference during the project planning and execution, even after the project is put into operation. But it is not meant to describe how this should be done. That is decided by the responsible ministry or government agency. The control elements are useful at the decision gate and later on.  There are several coordination arenas (Forums) where the Ministry of Finance gather key people from ministries, agencies, QA-consultants and researchers to discuss matters of principle and concern. Usually these processes result in common understanding and definition of terms and professional standards. This has resulted in a few supplementary guidelines.  The Concept Research Programme is supporting the development of the regime and studying the practices of the Agencies and QA-consultants. Measuring the effect of the governance framework has some attention, but not nearly as much as in UK. The programme acts as facilitator and secretary in several discussions, administers conferences and workshops, performs trailing research, performs own studies relevant to the parties involved in QA and publishes research results. All of these activities contribute to coordination and learning.     Comparing the two framework structures highlights some interesting differences: 
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NO: UK:  Parliament      ↓ Prime Minister/Government      ↓ Ministries      ↓ Agencies      ↓ Projects      ↓ Private sector  
 Parliament      ↓ Prime Minister/Government      ↓ Ministries      ↓ Agencies      ↓ Projects      ↓ Private sector  Figure 2 Vertical and horizontal integration of governance frameworks.  The vertical integration, as well as the horizontal, is quite different. The Norwegian governance framework goes all the way to the top, but stops above private sector (suppliers). The effect is expected to diffuse down to private sector as results are materializing. The UK framework on the other hand is going all the way down, but stops at Ministry level. Above this level, committee’s, NAO etc. supplement necessary governance reports and other functions. Horizontally, the UK framework (or its equivalents) is implemented by several responsible parties. The most notable ‘difference’ or rather the characteristic of the Norwegian framework, is its simplicity.   
NO: UK: - 2 gateways defined - 6 gateways defined, 5 of these at project level - Control rules established by contract - Review definitions / guidelines - QA-reports defined - Review roles defined in detail - External assessment - External assessment / Internal assessors used in some sectors. - Coordination arenas - Centres of excellence - Research program - Permanent administrative organisation  - Senior Responsible Owner  - Project Initiation Process Table 1 Comparison of framework elements  The comparison of the framework components show some of the same characteristic simplicity on the Norwegian side as the vertical and horizontal integration. The UK side is more comprehensive and adequate for more detailed control measures at a lower hierarchical level. Comparing with the literature discussed earlier in this paper it seems like the Norwegian side is purely on macro-analytic perspective, whereas the UK framework also includes the micro-analytic perspective. The organisation 
 Now 
Not part of this study 
OGC  NAO  MOD etc. Traditionally 
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implementing the UK governance framework also supplies the management system, the answer to the question; ‘how to achieve…’, where the Norwegian framework only answers ‘what to achieve…’.   The use of external consultants is quite similar in both countries. A characteristic difference is that in Norway competent companies are assigned, in UK competent individuals. This may suggest that there is a need for more experience and credibility on the individual consultants side in a framework based on influence and recommendations. The Norwegian framework is mandatory and consultants are thus not the ones that have to persuade the agencies and their project organisations. It is probably an important factor that the Norwegian process is one of breaking tradition and building ‘a new profession’. New professions are likely to attract younger professionals with the aspiration to find new ways of doing things, than a situation implementing best practice. Younger consultants need the support of the company’s resource base including seniors, so assigning a company and not individuals may be a good idea. The QA-assignments in Norway under the framework contract is always fronted by a senior consultant – so the difference is less important than this discussion may suggest. An external reason for choosing to assign companies and not individuals in Norway is also the very limited number of senior experts with the right knowledge to fill the role defined in the UK framework.  One characteristic difference between the two countries is the amount of resources used actually performing each assessment. In UK it comes down to a 4 day assessment by a senior consultant, planned, performed and reported over 11-12 weeks (Howard, 2007). In Norway the QA-team works over several months and performs complete independent analysis of the project; it may take 6 months or more and includes several meetings. In both countries the project organisation probably spends much more man-hours to prepare and support the assessments than is used to perform them.  5. Embedded governance principles  In both countries government representatives have expressed the intention to ensure best practice in planning and execution of projects. But how? Above is described the structure of the governance frameworks, their main elements and how the implementation is organized. To understand how this is actually supposed to work, it is important to understand the governance principles built into the framework, the principles mentioned by interviewees can be summarised: (a) Common governance principles (stated by both sides): - Transparency, openness for scrutiny, maximum openness about basis for decisions. - Learning, willingness to change. 
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- Setting common, high professional standards. - External control, independency. - Political anchoring of framework on high level. - QA/Gateway review is non-political. - Look for big, important trends, not the minor details. (b) Expected to be common principles (stated only by one side, but implicitly part of both): - Base projects on needs of the users - Decisions should be made at the appropriate political level. - Use senior competence as owner representative and in assessment  We identify some differences, shown in table 2.  
NO: UK: - Simplicity, robustness - Complete system - The management of expectation - Give recommendations (Follow the guidelines) - Mandatory, no short cuts - By influence - Strong focus on good performance of methods - Strong focus on business case - Choose concept early  - Choose strategy early  - Focus on cost/risk - Focus on criticality Table 2 Differences in governance principles  The most characteristic difference is the simplicity of the Norwegian framework compared to the completeness of the UK side (taking into account the toolboxes in the UK framework, not only the framework itself). The second most characteristic difference is the choice of a mandatory system in Norway and the persuasive recommendations on the UK side. Another characteristic difference is the focus on business case (contents and results) in UK vs. the focus on method in Norway. This corresponds with cultural differences mentioned earlier. In Norway the control measures are focussed on cost and risk (initially at least, but moving more towards benefit and value), whereas the UK side is focussed on the business case/value for money. This may be a measure of the maturity in the frameworks; the Norwegian being all new and the UK building on long tradition.     
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Discussion  There are of course many ways of interpreting this picture. The following discussion is not an attempt to put all the pieces together (more details are available). We want to find a bigger picture and focus on the aspects relevant to design of governance frameworks. Let’s start again with the objectives of the governance frameworks studied here. The espoused aim of the UK framework is specifically to achieve financial savings targets (as a combination of the work on commodities on projects). The development of Centres of Excellence was aimed to change the culture within Departments to business management (and OGC were to be a catalyst for this), all the way up and down Departments, and to establish governance. For both generations of the Norwegian QA-regime, the intention was to establish a system where politics and administration is well divided, and where the interplay between these is well understood. From an administrative point of view the important point is to ensure there is always a basis for decisions addressing all relevant sides of the issues involved, and independent assessment confirming its professional quality. The intended effect of such a system is making the State able to choose the right projects and execute them well.  In both cases, these objectives have to influence the choice of governance principles and the way the framework is implemented. Looking behind the different formulations of the goals (remembering the differences in culture above) the goals are quite similar. The initiatives in both countries are based on a wish to improve government to spend public funds more wisely, raising some interesting questions, eg: 1. Is there a common set of governance principles that would be good for all?  2. Are there any governance principles chosen by either side for specific reasons connected to the objectives they have?  3. If the objectives are the same – why did the frameworks come out so different?  The answer to the first question may be found in the common principles mentioned by the interviewees on both sides, and is summed up in Figure 3. Even though the governance principles mentioned do not cover all possible governance principles embedded in what the literature defines as ‘good governance’, these may be seen as an expression of the essence of good governance in major investment projects. Including these principles would perhaps be the best start for a country or company designing their major-project governance framework.  
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 Figure 3 Common governance principles  The answer to the second question is best answered by looking at the characteristic differences. The answer is probably found in a combination of the way the implementation is organized (see ‘how it works’ above), the vertical and horizontal integration (see figure 2) and the embedded governance principles (see table 2). This draws a picture of two governance frameworks with totally different faces. The aims are not the reason for the different designs. They are similar, so this picture illustrate that there is ‘more than one way to Rome’.  The choice of means to reach goals are obviously a question of which means is expected to give the best result under the actual circumstances. The ‘cultural factor’ is important both in how the aims are formulated and how the means are implemented. Understanding the mutual influence between the setting, the framework and the projects is the focus of our further studies.  Regarding the 3rd question, the short answer is: They are different by choice. The most important choice is probably the vertical integration illustrated in figure 2. In Norway the QA documents are available for decision makers at a high level and actually used in their decision making process. In UK the reports about each project stops at Ministry level, not reaching the top-level decision makers (if Parliament want reports, they use separate committees etc.).  This use of the reports at a high level is an important choice in development of the Norwegian governance framework. Firstly it means the documentation has to be understandable for decision makers, reducing the opportunistic approach of hiding facts behind professional jargon or in documents 
Decisions • Transparency of decision making • Participation • Predictability • Objectivity • Rationality & Realism 
Strategy • Political anchoring • Simplicity, Robustness  • Holistic • Completeness 
Management • Clarity of roles and responsibilities • Strong focus on good performance of methods • Focus on cost/risk and criticality • Focus on benefits/results/business case 
Performance • High but realistic performance standards • Measure performance and give feedback • Learning/Improvement 
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unavailable to decision makers. It also implies the principle of choosing a concept and strategies systematically and early in order to make this knowledge accessible and understandable for high level decision makers. They need to understand the consequences of their decisions. This use of the governance framework to support high-level political decision making without making the framework into a political tool is a strong side to the Norwegian framework.  The UK framework is obviously offering better support to the practical performance of major public investment projects. This framework has toolboxes attached, giving answers to a lot of important issues. If the choice is to include such features – UK is a good place to look. The combination of a mandatory scheme of control actions and the vertical integration is the basis for management of expectation in Norway: Our interviewee explained: ‘When everyone knows there is going to be a QA1 or QA2, they know what’s coming and they know they will have to face it. This changes the way they work. Expectation guides the action. And it is working on many levels and in all phases of the development. By starting on a high level (Prime Ministers Office) this create a positive spin-off at all levels below. Signals are diffused throughout the hierarchy.’ By using this effect to its full potential the implementation of the governance framework hardly needs any resources at all at the administrative level, as shown in the Norwegian case.  The horizontal integration is also interesting. In Norway the horizontal integration is secured by letting the same framework apply to all sectors (except Oil & Gas) and establish coordinating arenas where the parties meet to discuss and to agree on important principles. In UK the common toolboxes makes good practices available across sectors but lets each sector apply the framework(s) in their own way and licenses other parties to implement the framework (MOD etc.). A simple explanation for the Norwegian choice could be the cost of developing toolboxes: let the agencies pay their own development cost. This would be a sub-optimal decision since each would obviously have to develop many of the same elements. The reason could be that the different sectors are really very different – they all need their own specific solutions. This is explicitly said not to be the reason, and it would only be true on a lower level and within some special fields. The UK side proves that a common toolbox is valuable. To some extent tradition and sector jargon is hampering the development.  The real explanation for the Norwegian choice is found in the administrative tradition. At this point Norway and UK seems to be quite different. Norway has a strong tradition for bottom up processes and letting the lower levels make their own decisions. As a result, high level administration is in relatively weak position. The sectoral ministry is responsible for large investment projects, and the Minister is solely responsible towards the Parliament. The ministry is organized to support this 
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responsibility, not to take care of the projects. In practical terms, large government agencies under each sectoral ministry are governing the projects. In this situation choosing a mandatory control measure from the top seems natural in order to make a change. The framework is simple and has a ‘soft’ focus, but still it clearly represents a move towards a stronger position for the real decision makers.  The UK administrative tradition is characterized by a large influential Civil Service. Responsibility for project is entirely within the Department (Defence, Home Office etc.). Some Parliamentary review of Government work is performed as well as National Audit. Our interviewee mentioned the UK character, which he described as a ‘blame culture’ and geared towards hiding the facts to avoid blame. ‘Gateway reviews are looking to tease out the hidden facts. Participants from the projects sometimes clearly fear the reviews - they think it’s about blame so they are looking to hide the facts.’ This can be seen as indications of a top down administrative culture. In such a situation it is natural to choose measures which utilize the strong position and tradition of the administration. Implementing gateways and making best practice procedures and tools available by comprehensive toolboxes seems a natural choice. The strong tradition makes the message clear; these are good, credible solutions.  A point made by the Norwegian interviewee was the resource situation. At the time of implementation there was clearly opposition to this new scheme. Therefore the administration needed to focus on developing the framework and making way for its introduction. There were not enough people or knowledge available in the administration to choose a path like in UK. This made the choice easy – it should not include the resource demanding system development, and the practical implementation of the control tasks had to be all external. This gave a very practical argument pointing in the same direction as the principal arguments mentioned above.   Conclusion  The discussion above compares the established state-of-the-art framework in UK with the new one in Norway. As could be expected, they have much the same aims and many common features. Still they are very different. This does not necessary imply one is better than the other. The interesting point is the fact that good governance frameworks for major public investment projects can turn out different by design, as a result of taking into consideration the context (tradition, culture, administrative setting etc.). This means there are several interesting choices to be made regarding how the framework is designed and implemented. Some of the important questions are: 
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• How to secure a best possible political anchoring at a high level? This is important to make sure the framework is actually implemented and sustainable.  
• How to influence the real decisions and place the responsibility at the right level? If the framework is really going to matter it has to support better decisions.  
• How to make sure the framework does not risk being rejected or having to be changed as politics change and elections put new politicians in position? The necessary use of resources in operation and the adaptability of the framework will be important.  
• How to clarify the expectations all the way from owner down to those responsible for performance? Which policy instruments are used, and how strongly they are imposed are important choices.  
• How to clarify roles and responsibilities in the whole organisational setting? Owner, Decision Maker, Operator/User, Gatekeeper, Contractor etc. are important roles to define. Clarifying the border between political side and the administrative side is a key to improved governance and accountability. 
• How to avoid misunderstandings due to ambiguous words and concepts? Be explicit about macro- or micro-perspective and take the necessary steps to make common definitions stick. 
• How to secure there is no room for misconduct? Boosting transparency by use of independent assessment in control and participation in planning makes it possible. 
• How to improve performance? At the end of the day – this is what matters. Improved performance at all levels and in all processes is what really makes the results come forward. Choosing the means best suited to the actual setting is the major challenge.   Epilogue  As the research is currently developing, and case studies are carried out, new details may shed light on important aspects not yet addressed, or give new perspectives to the discussion in this paper. The conclusions will be developed further and adjusted. There are still some documents not investigated and a few more interviews left. Main findings in this paper are expected to be stable, but this is ongoing research! The further study takes us down into aspects such as the influence of these governance frameworks on time and cost planning and estimation. The study into actual projects planned under the UK and Norwegian governance frameworks is just starting, and we expect to have more details available autumn 2007.  
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